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ABSTRACT 
 
Assuming the national culture and the legal tradition of Greece, this paper addresses two 
questions. First, does the capital structure affect performance in the same way as in the mature 
economies? Second, does the short run financial policy of the firm affect the performance and 
under what circumstances? We apply a panel data analysis using data from the Athens Stock 
Exchange to test for these questions.  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
anagers decide the capital structure to achieve long- run maximization of firm’s value. Recent 
empirical literature found, using data from developed economies, that high debt to equity 
positively contributes to the firm’s value since debt restricts managers to act in the interests of 
shareholders. However, do managers operating in different cultural, legal and financial contexts act in the same way, 
as the literature suggests for developed countries?   
 
Majumbar (1997), Chhibber and Majumbar (1999), and Majumbar and Chhiber (1999), examining Indian 
manufacturing firms, found that the debt to equity ratio is negatively related to economic performance of the firms 
because of the Indian financial context.  
 
Greece belongs to the Mediterranean cultural cluster (Hofstede, 1984), with high uncertainty avoidance 
characterizing its work-related culture. The Greek legal system belongs to the German civil law family and reflects 
this cultural characteristic. Given the national culture and the commercial law, this paper addresses two questions. 
First, does capital structure affect profitability in Greece in the way literature suggests? Second, does short run 
financial management affect profitability? We apply a panel- data analysis using data from the Athens Stock 
Exchange to offer satisfactory answers to these questions. Our sample consists of 130 manufacturing firms for which 
complete data are available for the examination period, 1995-2000.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second part discusses the literature and sets the 
hypotheses. The third part gives the empirical results and the discussion. The fourth part concludes and gives some 
policy implications. Finally, the fifth part offers some suggestions for future research. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem states that leveraged firms do not increase their market value relative 
to non-leveraged firms in perfect markets. For this reason, capital structure is neutral to firm’s economic 
performance.  Following the publication of the M-M theorem, and considering the violations of the perfect markets 
assumption, a significant part of literature accepts that capital structure may have non-neutral effects on firm’s 
performance. Modigliani and Miller (1963) consider that the introduction of taxes may affect the impact of capital 
structure on market value as far as interest payments are tax deductibles.  
M 
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Agency cost theory and its empirical evidence, so far, assumes that the equity/ debt ratio negatively 
correlates to smaller performance, because of inefficient monitoring of the managers’ actions. This monitoring refers 
to total liabilities, financial and operating, because operating debt also plays an informational role, a signal of 
profitability and value (Nissim and Penman, 2003). This correlation should not be monotonic since at high levels of 
debt relative to equity, debt implies an agency cost of outside debt (including higher expected bankruptcy costs or 
financial distress) arising from conflicts between debt holders and shareholders (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2002).  
 
This correlation, however, is conditional on national cultural, legal and financial context. The legal system, 
through the bankruptcy and reorganization laws, deals with procedures that unfold in the case of failure to pay back 
debt. These procedures are part of the commercial law in civil law legal traditions. According to La Porta et al. 
(1998), the German-civil-law family, Greece is member of this family, is strongly pro-creditor. Since the banking 
system has played a dominant role in the Greek economy, from the early years of the Greek state in early 19th 
century, commercial law accommodates and protects mainly the banks than the borrowers. More specifically, Greek 
commercial law prevents managers from unilaterally getting protection from creditors. Creditors’ protection relies 
on liquidation than in reorganization and, in addition, secured creditors, and this is the case of banks, have the right 
to foreclose on their property when the claim matures and not when the borrower defaults (Houghton and Atkinson, 
1993, as cited in La Porta et al., 1998). Even, in the case of reorganization, the old management does not stay unless 
the senior creditor chooses to do so.  Therefore, debt finance increases the exposure to the risk of bankruptcy, both 
for the firm and the manager (reputation, salaries, etc.). Hence, managers feeling uncomfortable in high uncertainty 
situations, such as implied by the high bankruptcy cost, will be more efficient with high equity to debt ratio. Finally, 
in an environment characterized by high uncertainty avoidance, where the banking system exhibits the above 
idiosyncrasies, shareholders’ monitoring on managers is more intensive than banks’ monitoring. Therefore, we 
expect managers of firms with high equity to debt ratio to be more performance oriented. 
 
Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 Due to high uncertainty avoidance and the pro-creditor legal system, we expect 
firm’s higher equity to debt ratio to lead to higher return on assets. 
 
Working capital management is part of the short run policy of the firm.  Deloof (2003) finds that the 
components of working capital, inventories and accounts - receivable and payable, are strictly related with 
profitability. Net- working capital, the difference between current assets and current liabilities over total assets, 
roughly measures the company’s potential reservoir of cash. A higher net-working capital affects the firm’s 
profitability for two reasons. First, if current liabilities are low, relative to current assets, the firm gains in 
creditworthiness, leading suppliers to offer either low prices or better terms of payment (i.e. lower interest or longer 
maturity). Second, a higher net-working capital may stimulate sales because firm could offer better credit terms to 
customers. 
 
Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 The higher the net-working capital ratio the higher the return on assets. 
 
Inventory management is component of working capital management. Inventories turnover is the cost of 
products and services sold over inventories. Quick renewal of inventories, with small orders, leads to an unattractive 
credit policy from suppliers. In addition, the low level of inventories may lead to frequent shortages either of raw 
material or ready products, (DeLoof, 2003). Hence, low inventories may lead to loss of customers or /and to 
inappropriate pricing policy to customers.  
 
Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 The lower the inventory turnover ratio, the higher the return on assets. 
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Finally, we include some control factors for their influence on business profitability. Most of the empirical 
studies use size as one of the factors affecting business profitability. Returns and economies of scale explain its 
significance. We use two alternative measures for the firm’s size, in this study, the logarithm of sales and the 
logarithm of book-value equity. 
 
The way management exploits the invested capital to create sales and profits represents the managerial and 
marketing skills. Total assets turnover defined as sales to total assets, to a significant degree, is a measure of 
managerial and marketing skills.  
 
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Following the discussion of the previous section, we derive equation (1) which is the model for the firm i in 
the year t: 
 
ititiitiitiitiitiittitit uETLbLEVbINVbSbOLbNWCbaROA +++++++= 654321        (1) 
 
where i stands for firms and t for time. All ratios are calculated using book-values, since book-values are good 
proxies for the values of assets in place (Myers, 1984; Hall, et al. 2004). The variables used are: 
 
ROA, return on assets or investment, is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets (2).  
 
NWC, net- working capital, is the current assets minus current liabilities over total assets ratio.  
 
OL, total assets turnover, is sales to total assets. 
 
S, size of the firm, is the logarithm of the volume of sales or the logarithm of the book-valued equity. 
 
INV, inventory turnover, is the ratio of cost of goods sold to inventories. 
 
ETL, capital structure, is the ratio of the book-valued equity to total liabilities. We use the book value instead of 
market value of equity because there is evidence that managers think in book-values (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
Moreover, market value includes both tangible and intangible assets. Stakeholders, such as bondholders, are 
interested in getting their money back. Intangible assets may vanish in case of bankruptcy. Tangible assets only 
remain for liquidation (collaterals). Therefore, bondholders use book- value of equity instead of market value.    
 
LEV is the product of net- working capital ratio to total leverage over total assets ratio. As Nissim and Pennan 
(2003) note, total liabilities consist of operating liabilities (i.e. accounts payable) and financial liabilities (i.e. bank 
loans). The financial liabilities raise cash for operations while operating liabilities arise from operations. Companies 
that have high total liabilities to total assets ratio probably have potential to pursue short- term financial policy in 
sales and purchases.  DeLoof and Jeger (1996), as reported in DeLoof (2003), found that firms, which face a 
shortage of cash, might reduce investment in accounts receivable. Hence, the access to credit either from financial 
institutions or from suppliers, contributes to the working capital management. Firms may invest to accounts 
receivable by offering credit to customers increasing that way their sales, which may finally lead to higher 
profitability. Therefore, the product of the net working capital to the ratio of total liabilities over total assets (LEV in 
our data set) is a proxy for the synergetic effects of total liabilities on net working capital (3). Taking the partial 
derivative of equation (1) with respect to NWC we get: 
 
TA
TL
bb
NWC
ROA
51 +=

  (2) 
 
In equation 2, the coefficient b1 measures the direct impact of NWC on the return on assets and the rest 
measures the synergetic effect of total liabilities to total assets with net-working capital. 
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The constant term ai is the individual effect or individual heterogeneity for the firm i. The uit  are the 
idiosyncratic errors or disturbances because they change across time as well as across firms. The key issue is the 
correlation between ai and the observed explanatory variables. If the correlation between ai and the explanatory 
variable is zero, that is Cov(xit, ai)=0, t=1,2,…, T, then the random effect is appropriate. On the other hand, if this 
correlation is statistically significant then fixed effect estimation is the appropriate procedure (Wooldridge, 2001). 
 
3.1  Data  
 
We use data for 130 manufacturing companies, listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, for the period 1995-
2000. The sample firms are the most important manufacturing firms of Greece. The data are from the financial 
statements of the individual firms as reported by the Athens Stock Exchange.  
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
     
  Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.119 0.129 -2.037 0.699 
LNSAL 17.058 1.249 12.713 21.903 
LNBVE 16.674 1.287 12.509 21.741 
NWC 0.202 0.194 -0.403 0.812 
OL 0.861 0.400 0.016 2.614 
ETL 0.310 0.888 -2.643 4.591 
INV 10.286 117.157 0.106 3072.629 
 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The mean percentage of the return on assets is 11.9% with a 
maximum of 69.9%. The average net working capital is 20.2% of the total assets. It is worth noting that it ranges 
from -40.3% to 81.2%, which means that some firms having negative net working capital, faced difficulties to 
finance their sales policy. On the other hand, some firms by exhibiting a net working capital ratio close to 80%, 
almost four times the sample’s average, may also applied wrong financial policy. The average inventory turnover 
was 10.2 times. However, it is interesting that some firms followed a very high turnover, having actually no 
inventories. The average equity to debt ratio is 31%, that is Greek listed firms finance their assets using one quarter 
equity and three quarters debt. However, there are firms with high equity and firms with very high indebtedness. The 
average sales to total assets ratio is 0.86, which means that the total assets turnover is less than one. Voulgaris, et al. 
(2004) estimated the same ratios for a sample of large Greek companies, listed in the Athens Stock Exchange and 
non-listed. If we compare those ratios with our estimations we see that the average in net-working capital and the 
return on assets of our sample is higher than those in Voulgaris et.al.(2004), while the sales to total assets and 
inventories are lower than those estimated by Voulgaris et al.(2004). These differences may firstly attributed to 
firms’ effect. Secondly, since the time span of our sample covers the period 1995-2000, different from the 
examination period of Voulgaris et al. (2004), time may also explain this difference. It is also worth noting that 
DeLoof (2003) estimated the days of inventories for Belgian firms to 46.6, which is closer to our estimations.   
 
 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 LNSAL LNBVE NWC OL ETL INV 
LNSAL       
LNBVE 0.82      
NWC 0.002 -0.091     
OL 0.25 -0.21 0.15    
ETL -0.048 0.35 0.55 -0.24   
INV -0.006 -0.002 0.008 0.019 0.056  
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Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Since the correlation coefficients are less than 0.5, it 
indicates non-existence of multicollinearity. 
 
3.2  Empirical Results And Discussion 
 
Table 3 presents the empirical estimations. We present the panel estimations with fixed and random effects 
and pooled OLS. The reported F- statistic under the fixed effect estimation suggests that the pooled OLS estimation 
is not appropriate in dealing with the data of our sample. The Hausman- test suggests that the hypothesis of 
correlation between the individual effects with the disturbance term is not statistically valid and therefore, the 
random effect procedure is more appropriate.  
 
 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(1) 
Pooled 
OLS 
(1) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(2) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS 
(2) 
LNBVE 0.125 
(1.391) 
0.193 
(0.365) 
-0.00173 
(0.472) 
   
LNSAL    -0.009 
(0.914) 
-0.0002 
(0.058) 
-0.0027 
(0.739) 
NWC 0.0315 
(0.669) 
0.0715* 
(1.687) 
0.1225*** 
(2.861) 
0.0384 
(0.823) 
0.0731* 
(1.728) 
0.1219*** 
(2.853) 
OL 0.1098*** 
(5.224) 
0.1004*** 
(6.678) 
0.1014*** 
(8.277) 
0.094*** 
(5.202) 
0.0992*** 
(6.644) 
0.1047*** 
(8.071) 
LEV 0.1037*** 
(2.638) 
0.0986*** 
(2.754) 
0.1032*** 
(2.821) 
0.109*** 
(2.784) 
0.0997*** 
(2.795) 
0.1028*** 
(2.828) 
ETL 0.0296*** 
(2.744) 
0.0244*** 
(2.815) 
0.0181** 
(2.386) 
0.0362*** 
(3.863) 
0.0255*** 
(3.138) 
0.0174** 
(2.419) 
INV -0.0003 
(0.610) 
-0.0011** 
(2.519) 
-0.0017*** 
(4.682) 
-0.0003 
(0.632) 
-0.0011** 
(2.505) 
-0.0017*** 
(4.629) 
Constant   0.1426** 
(2.418) 
 0.1355* 
(1.628) 
0.1558*** 
(2.681) 
R2-adj. 0.56 0.22 0.24 0.56 0.22 0.24 
LM-heteroscedasticity 0.685 
(p=0.408) 
0.0626 
(p=802) 
0.0161 
(p=0.899) 
0.854 
(p=355) 
0.105 
(p=0.745) 
0.0265 
(p=0.87) 
F-test(a,b=ai,b) 5.4132 
(p=0.000) 
  5.3704 
(p=0.000) 
  
Hausman Test  x2(7)=10.859 
(p=0.1449) 
  x2(7)=9.966 
(p=0.1905) 
 
Note: t-statistic in parentheses 
* statistically significant at the 0.01 level , ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level , *** statistically significant at the 0.001 
level , 
 
 
Although most of the previous studies have identified the size of the firm as a significant factor in 
explaining the variation of profitability, our empirical findings do not support those findings. It supports, however, 
Glancey(1998) who also found that size does not affect performance. This finding could be because the sample 
firms are large and the variability of the size variable is relatively small.  
 
 The estimated coefficient of sales to total assets ratio is statistically significant and has the theoretical sign. 
Thus, the efficient exploitation of the invested capital affects positively the return on assets.   
 
The coefficients of the net working capital (NWC) and the synergetic effect (LEV) determine the total 
effect of the working capital management on performance. The estimated coefficients are both significant and 
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positive. This result is similar to that found in DeLoof and Jeger (1996).  The estimated coefficient of the LEV is 
positive and close to 0.1. Financial leverage may lead to better operating performance and a higher ROA. According 
to these findings whenever financial leverage increases by one percent the impact of the net working capital on ROA 
increases by 10%. This result is plausible since the lack of own working capital is one of the major problems that 
Greek firms usually face. Thus, the access to credit, from financial institutions or suppliers, improves their 
efficiency and leads to higher profitability.    
 
The estimated coefficient of the inventory turnover (INV) is statistically significant and has a negative sign. 
Firms, which follow a low inventory management, high inventory turnover, risk their sales volume since some 
customers may find difficult to be served due to low inventories. Therefore, high inventories turnover may lead to 
lower sales and consequently to low profitability.  
 
The estimated coefficient of equity to debt ratio is statistically significant and positive. This result is similar 
to that found by Gleason et al (2000) for European retailers, Majumbar, and Chibber (1999) for domestic and 
foreign firms in India. The positive coefficient of the equity to debt ratio suggests that firms with higher equity than 
debt are more profitable than firms, which financed their assets with debt. The following reasons explain this 
finding. First, the Athens Stock Exchange exhibited a rapid increase during the examination period. An explosion in 
savings’ flows to stock market followed this increase to stock market due to the expected positive prospects. Thus, 
the cost of financing through new equity was lower than the cost of debt issuing. The issuance of new equity, in 
almost all cases, did not significantly change the equity structure and consequently the management of the firms. 
Thus, the risk from issuing new equity was considered lower than the risk from new debt (bankruptcy cost, etc.).  
Therefore, firms, which proceeded to restructuring of their capital structure by increasing equity relative to debt, 
were rewarded with an increase in returns on assets. 
 
Second, contrary to the agency cost hypothesis, financial institutions in Greece do not monitor management 
actions to secure debt repayment. Private and public banks do not relate the firm’s performance with the security of 
the loan. They prefer the real estate guarantee.  Therefore, debt is not related to better monitoring but to higher 
bankruptcy cost.  
 
Finally, Voulgaris et al.(2002;2004) found a negative impact of net profits/sales ratio on  total debt/ total 
assets ratio. The authors argue that large firms prefer retain earnings than debt as a source of financing assets. Our 
findings as far as the sign of the relation are similar to those found by Voulgaris et al. (2002; 2004). However, we 
believe that the causality is vice versa. Firm’s management could not consider capital structure as a strategic aim or 
even objective per se. Capital structure is a strategic variable in the process to achieve the optimum firm’s value in 
the end. Hence, the causality between profits and capital structure is one way from, capital structure to long run 
profits. Obviously, many empirical studies have recognized critical factors that affect capital structure and profits are 
among them (according to pecking order theory of Myers (1984)). However, we should not forget that the 
management considers these factors in order to determine the optimum capital structure with the criterion of the 
achievement of maximum long run profits. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Using contemporary data, this paper investigated the relationship between capital structure, short run 
financial management and profitability. The analysis covered 130 industrial firms listed in the Athens Stock 
Exchange, the stock market of Greece, for the period 1995-2000.  
 
Our findings, with respect to the impact of capital structure on returns on assets, are similar to those found 
in countries with financial sector similar the Greek one. One reason that explains this result is the culture of high 
uncertainty avoidance national culture and the pro-creditor commercial law. In such a case, managers consider that 
the bankruptcy cost or financial distress, for the firm and themselves, is high. In order to minimize these costs they 
choose low debt/high equity. A second reason is the restructuring of the capital structure in favor of equity in times 
of stock exchange expansion, because of the lower total cost of issuance new equity relative to debt. Since the 
stakeholders had better monitor the listed firms and since the banking sector has no incentive to monitor the debtor 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Third Quarter 2008  Volume 24, Number 3 
51 
due to the bankruptcy laws, managers are induced to apply better management and they are rewarded with higher 
returns on assets.     
 
The net- working capital management has a positive impact on the returns on assets. Financial leverage 
intensifies this positive effect.  Again, the cultural context explains this result. Short run policies bear less 
uncertainty than the long run ones. Therefore, managers are more willing to finance their working capital using 
leverage instead of debt for long run investments. Therefore, the impetus provided by the financial leverage on 
working capital improves the firm’s profitability.  
 
Finally, inventories management seems to play a significant role in the explanation of profitability. Our 
empirical findings show that high inventories turnover may lead to lower sales and consequently to low profitability.  
 
Concluding, our results seem to be similar to those found by other authors for countries with different 
institutional setting, e.g. India, and different cultural setting, for example, Gleason et al. (2000). Our findings 
support the view that the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of capital structure on profitability in 
the industrial countries, may not necessarily hold in different settings.  
 
5.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Our findings differentiate from previous findings in developed economies with different cultural and social 
context. The national accounting methods applied so far have prevented the comparison between firms in different 
countries. The adoption of International Accounting Standards, at least by the OECD countries, provides the 
opportunity to test theories using data from firms in different social and cultural contexts. 
 
NOTES 
 
(1)  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 9 th International Conference of the Economic Society 
of Thessaloniki. We express our gratitude to T. Kessapidou for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
(2)  We also used the return on equity as a measure of profitability as a robust check. The results were similar to 
those found using returns on assets. 
(3)  For methodology on synergetic effect, see Zinnes et al. (2001) 
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